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Abstract. Instead of relying completely on machine intelligence in anomaly 
event analysis and correlation, in this paper, we take one step back and investi-
gate the possibility of a human-interactive visual-based anomaly detection sys-
tem for faults and security attacks related to the BGP (Border Gateway Proto-
col) routing protocol. In particular, we have built and tested a program, based 
on fairly simple information visualization techniques, to navigate interactively 
real-life BGP OASC (Origin AS Change) events. Our initial experience demon-
strates that the integration of mechanic analysis and human intelligence can ef-
fectively improve the performance of anomaly detection and alert correlation. 
Furthermore, while a traditional representation of OASC events provides either 
little or no valuable information, our program can accurately identify, correlate 
previously unknown BGP/OASC problems, and provide network operators with 
a valuable high-level abstraction about the dynamics of BGP. 
1   Introduction 
An anomaly detection system is designed to detect any significant differences statisti-
cally between a long-term historical profile and a short-term behavior. We need to 
apply some mathematical models both to produce the long-term profiles and to com-
pare them with short-term behaviors.  On the other hand, a “visual-based” anomaly 
detection system is to utilize human’s cognitive visualization capability to detect any 
significant differences visually between the particular human user’s mental model [1] 
of the long-term behavior and his/her short-term visual observation. In short, a visual 
anomaly is something that catches his/her eyes. While the idea of visual-based anom-
aly detection is certainly not new – we have been doing it in our daily life for thou-
sands of years,  the focus here is to report our results in applying this concept to detect 
potential security problems due to OASC (Origin AS Change) events under the BGP 
routing protocol. 
With the popularity of the Internet technology, unintentional faults and intentional 
intrusions directly on network protocols, such as routing protocols, have become a 
serious threat to our Internet-connected society. In 1997, a buggy BGP (Border Gate-
way Protocol) [2] router falsely de-aggregated thousands of network addresses which 
disabled the Internet in the entire US east coast for up to 12 hours. In 2001, worm 
attacks such as CodeRed and Nimda were spread around the Internet, while the Rene-
sys report [3] discussed a possible correlation between worm attacks and routing pro-
tocol stability. In [4], a different interpretation of the Renesys observation indicated 
that the large increase in the number of BGP messages was mainly due to the behavior 
of the measurement points, and probably not related to the BGP routing stability. 
Driven by these faulty or intrusive instances on the Internet infrastructure, many re-
search teams have studied how to either design new protocols and/or enhance existing 
protocols such that the Internet can be more robust and fault/intrusion-tolerant. For 
instance, the Secure BGP (S-BGP) [5] protocol utilizes the PKI infrastructure to au-
thenticate and authorize the route update messages in an inter-domain environment. In 
[6], a program is developed to statistically profile the “stable” BGP paths leading to 
critical DNS servers and to filter out “unusual” routes potentially being falsely in-
jected by attackers or simply misbehaving BGP routers. 
Another complementary approach to handle these Internet vulnerabilities is via an 
interactive process between network administrators/operators and network manage-
ment systems with visualized network/security information. We believe that, at least in 
the short term, a network system with machine intelligence alone will have certain 
limitations in detecting and responding to novel attacks/faults targeting on the Internet 
infrastructure itself. For instance, given a colorful image of some BGP routing data, an 
experienced human operator might discover numerous facts about the Internet in-
stantly, while an analysis program must already have the mechanisms built in to 
achieve the same results. One of the most difficult tasks in intrusion detection is 
“event correlation,” but via human visualization, this task may be much more plausi-
ble. Furthermore, due to the complexity and size of the Internet, it is already a very 
difficult task to evaluate Internet’s “health” and clearly identify the root causes of 
some observed symptoms. Without a comprehensive understanding of the Internet, it 
is not certain that some new Internet protocols, architecture, or enhancements will be 
effective in responding to the problems we have today. 
This paper describes our design, implement, and evaluate an experimental visual 
anomaly detection system for BGP OASC (Origin AS Change) events. In the follow-
ing section, we will describe our visualization design for the BGP/OASC events in 
Sections 2, 3, and 4. Then, in Section 5, we will report our results in using our visual-
based anomaly system to detect non-trivial BGP/OASC problems. 
2 Visualization Design 
Information visualization [7] has emerged as one of the most active areas of computer 
science research in recent years due to the explosive growth of the World Wide Web. 
In contrast to scientific visualization, which is primarily about transforming numerical 
data defining physical structures or phenomena in three spatial dimensions into pic-
tures, information visualization generally maps very large amount of textual, sym-
bolic, or relational data into spatial forms that can be displayed graphically. Data 
visualization exploits the human vision system to help us explore and better communi-
cate with others particular aspects of the data under study. The process of visualization 
is an inherently iterative one consisting of multiple steps. A standard visualization 
process is depicted in the following figure: 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. a standard visualization process 
In this research work, we pay special attention to the filtering and mapping steps, 
which prepare the collected data for rendering and viewing.  Generally, the filtering 
step: removes “noise” from the raw data, reduces the data to a more manageable size, 
or enhances particular aspects of the data. 
For visual anomaly detection, it extracts and organizes particular aspects of the data 
(e.g., the Origin AS changes in BGP routing) for the subsequent steps. The mapping 
step transforms the filtered data into a collection of graphics entities with appropriate 
properties (e.g., colors, transparency, and texture) for rendering.  
To summarize, our visualization design has the following four advantages. First, 
our system integrates the capability of cognitive pattern matching (i.e., utilizing hu-
man’s capability in recognizing special “possibly previously unknown” patterns). 
Second, the visual/graphical information from our program may trigger the human’s 
intelligence and memory to reason and analyze the observed situation. A human op-
erator will obtain experience via this process and be trained to more accurately iden-
tify the problems quickly. Third, the interactive monitoring and analysis process pro-
vides a feedback loop from the human back into our program. Finally, the human 
expert can provide an in depth explanation about the potential problems using the 
annotated images and/or animations derived. In the following section, we will demon-
strate these advantages via the example of BGP/OASC. 
3 OASC (Origin AS Change) Events in BGP 
In this section, we very briefly describe the BGP routing protocol and the definition of 
OASC events. 
The Internet is made of thousands of Autonomous Systems (ASes), loosely defined 
as a connected group of one or more IP prefixes which have a single and clearly de-
fined routing policy [8]. BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) [2] is the standard inter-AS 
routing protocol. A BGP route lists a particular prefix (destination) and the path of 
ASes used to reach that prefix.  The last AS in an AS path is the origin of the BGP 
routes (or the origin AS). The concept of origin AS is critical for the consideration of 
routing protocol security as it implies the ownership of the IP address prefix (destina-
Data Collection Filtering Mapping Rendering Viewing 
tion). An OASC (Origin AS Change) event occurs if we observe any change in the IP 
address ownership. 
 A common example of OASC events is when suddenly we observe multiple ASes 
simultaneously claiming the ownership of the same address prefix. More precisely, 
suppose prefix d is associated with AS paths asp1 = (p1, p2, …, pn) and asp2 = (q1,q2, 
…, qm),  and pn is not equal to qm. 
An OASC event can be either valid or invalid.  The multiple-AS OASC event de-
scribed above, for example, is legitimate if each originating AS can directly reach the 
prefix. On the other hand, if one of the origin ASes cannot reach the prefix, then it is 
an invalid MOAS conflict and may be due to some malicious attacks. The problem of 
detecting invalid OASC events is further complicated by BGP operational practices. 
RFC1930 [19] only recommends (not requires) that each prefix originates from a 
single AS. In general, we have no way to determine whether a OASC event is the 
result of a fault, an attack, or a legitimate operational policy. 
Faulty aggregation or de-aggregation may cause invalid OASC events. For instance, 
an AS advertises an aggregated prefix, even though some of more specific prefixes are 
not reachable by the AS, while there are no other more specific routes available to 
reach those more specific prefixes.  On the other hand, as an example of de-
aggregation, on April 25th, 1997, a severe Internet outage occurred when one ISP 
falsely de-aggregated most of the Internet routing table and advertised the prefixes as 
if they originated from the faulty ISP. The falsely originated prefixes resulted in many 
invalid OASC events, which had a serious impact on Internet routing. 
For producing OASC events, we used the raw data from the Oregon Route Views 
server (peering with 54 BGP routers in 43 different ASes) to obtain the BGP routes 
and AS paths. The Oregon Route Views data is particularly attractive because it pro-
vides data from a number of different vantage points. Overall 38225 OASC events 
were observed over 1279 days, and there is a significant increase from 683 events (in 
average) in 1998 to 1294 events (in average) in 2001 as shown in the following “tradi-
tional 2D” figure. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. OASC events in the Internet from 1998 to 2001 
Via the above 2D figure about OASC events, we can spot some event 
spikes/anomalies in the past. For instance, in early 2001, one single AS caused 9177 
OASC events in one day. However, from the figure itself (or the raw data), it is not 
easy to derive more valuable information about the problem. Neither could we tell 
what was the response or reaction from this or other ASes after this particular BGP 
problem instance. 
4 The Design of our Visual-based Anomaly Detection System 
We have designed and prototyped a visualization program to support an interactive 
process for analyzing BGP OASC events.  Via our initial experiments, we have clearly 
observed some great advantages in using information visualization techniques to ana-
lyze and correlate a large number of BGP/OASC events. In this section, we will first 
briefly describe our design. Then, in the next section, we will show a few scenarios of 
using our program to not only detect the problem but also quickly nail down the root 
cause to the detected problem. 
4.1 Types of Origin AS Changes in BGP 
As mentioned before, from the raw BGP data collected, we can produce a set of  
“Origin AS Change (OASC)” events. Each Origin AS Change (OASC) event contains 
the following five attributes: 
Prefix is the IP prefix whose Origin AS has changed.  
AS-before is a list of the associated AS(es) before the change.  
AS-after is a list of the associated AS(es) after the change.  
Date is the date on which the change occurred. 
Type is the type of a OASC change event. 
Furthermore, OASC events are classified into 4 main types and then further classi-
fied into 8 types in total. The 4 main classes are: 
B-type: An AS announces a more specific prefix out of a larger block it already owns. 
This might be OK due to possibly traffic engineering. 
H-type: An AS announces a more specific prefix out of a larger block belonging to 
another AS. In other words, this AS punches a hole on prefix addresses belonging to 
others. 
C-type: An AS announces a prefix previously owned by another AS. 
O-type: An AS announces a prefix previously not owned (and therefore owned by 
ICANN by default). 
The C-type and O-type changes are further classified by whether they involve Sin-
gle Origin AS (SOAS) or Multiple Origin ASes (MOAS): 
CSM: C-type change from   SOAS   to MOAS 
CSS: C-type change from   SOAS   to SOAS 
CMS: C-type change from   MOAS   to SOAS 
CMM: C-type change from   MOAS   to MOAS 
OS:  O-type change involving   SOAS 
OM:  O-type change involving   MOAS 
H: H-type change always involving another AS (being punched a hole) 
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B: B-type change always involving itself only 
The color associated with each of the eight types will be used in interpreting the 
screen snapshots later. A colorful version of this paper can be downloaded from our 
web site. 
4.2 Representing IP Address Prefixes 
In representing BGP/OASC events, 2 key concepts are IP address prefix and Autono-
mous systems. We will first describe our quad-tree representation of IP address pre-
fixes. 
In our prototype, each IP prefix maps to one 
pixel on a square. The mapping is done in a 
traditional quad-tree manner as shown on the 
left. In a quad-tree, a square is repeatedly sub-
divided into 4 equal squares. In mapping a 32-
bit prefix to a square, we start with the first 
two most significant bits of the address to place 
the IP address in one of the 4 squares in the 
second level of the quad-tree. We then use the 
next two most significant bits to place the IP 
prefix in the appropriate third level square 
within this square. We do this repeatedly until 
we can place the prefix in a square the size of a single pixel. The prefix is mapped to 
that pixel. 
As an example, the following is the visualiza-
tion of data for 416 days up till February 19, 2001. 
The main window shows the quad-tree mapping of 
the entire space of 32-bit IP address. A pixel is 
colored yellow if an Origin AS Change occurred 
on the current day (February 19, 2001), and col-
ored brown to green if a change occurred on a 
previous day (January 1, 2000 through February 
18, 2001). In the windows showing detail, a square 
is used to depict each change, with hue determined 
by the type of the change, brightness determined by how long ago the change occurred 
(present day data shown the brightest), and size determined by the mask of the prefix. 
The background of the main window is shaded according to the IP prefix the pixel 
represents. The brighter the pixel, the larger the IP prefix represented. 
Due to the limitations of a computer screen space, we use a 512x512 pixel square to 
represent the entire 32-bit IP prefix space. With only 512x512 pixels, even though 
many IP prefixes map to the same pixel, we found that this is sufficient in spreading 
out the IP addresses in BGP/OASC events. IP prefixes sharing similar more significant 
bits would be in close proximity on the screen. With an additional level of zooming 
into a portion of the data, we can view individual IP prefixes as shown above. In the 
detail windows, each IP prefix is shown as a square or a rectangle. The size of the 
rectangle indicates the size of the block of IP addresses; a prefix with a smaller mask 
gets mapped to a larger rectangle. 
4.3 Relationship Between Prefix and AS 
To represent the relationship between IP address prefix 
and different ASes, we place 4 lines surrounding the IP 
square, and an AS number is mapped to a pixel on one 
of the 4 lines. A line is then drawn from an IP address to 
an AS number if there is an Origin AS change involving 
that IP address and that AS number. This mapping takes 
advantage of the user's acute ability to recognize posi-
tion, orientation and length. This figure shows visually 
the IPAddrPrefix-AS relationship of Origin AS Changes 
of “a typical day” (April 5, 2001). The color of each line 
represents one of the eight different OASC types. 
Since there are more AS numbers than pixels, more than one AS numbers map to a 
single pixel. Again, we provide zooming features for the user to differentiate between 
AS numbers, which map to the same pixel in the main display. The lines representing 
changes for the AS in focus is shown with brighter and more saturated colors than 
other changes. This effectively highlights the AS, fading the other changes into the 
background. 
4.4 Animation and Other Features 
For the time dimension, our program shows one day's data at a time, and allows the 
user to animate the visualization (each frame showing consecutive day's data). With 
this ``movie'' display, the user can build up a mental long-term profile in his/her mind, 
and detect temporal patterns. To assist our memory of patterns from previous days, we 
allow a user-defined window of a certain number of days prior to the currently shown 
date. Data from these previous days are displayed, but with darker, less saturated 
colors, so that the current day's data stands out. 
For the convenience of the user, we also provide textual display of the IP address or 
AS number represented by the pixel clicked by the user. Another feature for con-
venience is a slider bar to tell the date of the current data shown. The user can click on 
the bar to choose the date to show. A simple plot of the total number of changes of 
each type on each day is shown with the bar. 
By choosing parameters like what IP prefixes to zoom in on, which AS numbers to 
focus on, which type of changes to view etc., the user follows an interactive process to 
navigate abstract information in different levels of details. Depending on the combina-
tion of chosen parameters, the user can see the overall pattern of the data, or the user 
can focus attention on very specific parts of the data. Different choices would reveal 
different anomalies and information. 
5 Detecting and Analyzing OASC Anomalies Visually 
A simple “counter-based” 2D figure for historical OASC events, as shown earlier, can 
represent some simple OASC related anomalies. But, the value of the information is 
relatively inadequate to the system administrators dealing with the network instances. 
In this section, we present two examples of using our visualization program interac-
tively to identify and analyze OASC problems. With our program, the system adminis-
trators can easily move deep into the data and discover critical and abstractive facts 
above a large set of low-level network events. In reading this part of paper, please use 
a color viewer or printer. 
5. 1 Interactive Visual Analysis: “What went wrong on August 14, 2000?” 
On August 14, 2000, when we turned on all eight 
OASC types and monitored on all ASes, we could tell 
something was obviously wrong from the following 
screenshot. Since the amount of “blue” was abnor-
mally large to catch our attention, our initial hypothe-
sis was that, due to configuration errors possibly, one 
or more ASes punched a large number of holes on the 
IP address prefixes belonging to other innocent ASes. 
Please note that, if we examine the traditional 2D 
figure presented in Section 4, we can only observe a 
really small glitch on the same day. 
Immediately, to verify our hypothesis, we used the “AS detail” feature in our pro-
gram to select only one single H type OASC event and displayed the ASes being in-
volved. The rationale is that, if a very small number of ASes are the root causes for 
the aggressive Hole-punching problem, selecting one of such event would lead us to 
one of the “trouble makers.” The figure below on the left shows that after we selected 
one AS randomly (AS-11724 in our example). In the same figure, the “solid blue” line 
connects the victim AS (AS-11724) and the prefix address (207.50.48.0/21) being 
hole-punched, while the “dash blue” line connects the attacking AS (AS-7777) and a 
subset of the prefix address (207.50.53.251/32). In other words, AS-7777 would at-
tract all the traffic toward 207.50.53.251 from AS-11724, which supposed to be the 
true owner. Immediately, we know that the potential attacker (or faulty BGP router) 
was from AS-7777. Now, we can use the features in our program to only select the 
OASC events related to AS-7777, and we have the middle snapshot. In fact, after 
focusing on AS-7777, we can easily validate that this AS was the only AS causing H 
type events on August 14, 2000. However, we also observed certain amount of OS 
type events (the “pink” links), and more interestingly, it seems to us that the pattern of 
the pink links was regularly distributed across a region of IP address prefixes that has 
never been used or allocated in Internet as in the right figure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To validate further about what exactly is going on, 
we used our 3D representation to analyze all the pink 
links. With the left figure, from the left middle part 
(circled by a thick yellow dash line), it is very clear 
and interesting that AS-7777 announced prefix ad-
dresses forming a grid in the unused IP address space. 
Based on the location and shape of the grid and the 
raw events, we concluded that AS-7777 falsely an-
nounced from 65.0.0.0/8 to 126.0.0.0/8 plus many 
others. 
Please note that the discovery of the pink grid is trivial by human, if the visual ori-
entation is right. However, the same task would be very difficult for a fully automated 
intrusion detection system to reveal this type of facts unless the pattern matching 
mechanism for grids has been included in advance. Certainly, this case shows the 
limitation of the traditional intrusion detection systems in detecting “un-
known/new/novel” attacks, while our visual-based anomaly detection system has a 
very good chance to catch them. In the case of August 14, 2000, with a few clicks 
interactively, our system not only helped detect the problem, but also, quickly nailed 
down the trouble source, AS-7777. Furthermore, via visualization, it even can tell the 
details about the errors from AS-7777. 
5.2 Interactive Visual Correlation: “What was AS-15412 doing in April 2001?” 
Earlier we showed that on April 5, 2001, things looked “normal”. But, on April 6, the 
next day, we observed a unusual amount of “skyblue” – the CSM events. A CSM event 
indicates that a particular IP address prefix was originated by one AS the previous day, 
but more than one ASes are claiming it on the current day. With the possibility of 
multi-homing and private AS numbers, a small amount of the “skyblue” CSM events is 
probably acceptable, but the snapshot on the left below is visually abnormal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Again with a simple interactive analysis process, very quickly we identified that 
AS-15412 is the only AS injecting all the “skyblue” CSM conflicts on April 6, 2001. 
In the middle snapshot above, it shows that AS-15412 is conflicting with a victim AS-
10132, which is the Eastar Technology Center in Hongkong. (We randomly picked 
one of the victims and we used the “whois” program to find out more information 
from the whois server, whois.radb.net.) Furthermore, after we animated the data only 
related to AS-15412, we found something interesting: AS-15412 not only injected 
thousands of CSM “skyblue” events on April 6, but also, from April 7 to 12, it intro-
duced thousands of CMS “yellow” events.  This indicates that, right after the CSM 
mistakes on April 6, 2001, the system administrator responsible for the AS-15412 
problem started to “correct” the problems by withdrawing the bad announcements, 
which caused a storm of CMS events during next 6 days. The trouble AS was a small 
ISP (Internet Service Provider) called FLAG Telecom Global Internet in London, UK. 
However, a few days later, on April 18, 2001 (4 days later), AS-15412 caused (at 
least, it seems to us visually) exactly the same mistake again, and the “shape” is ex-
actly the same as the one on April 6 (possibly reloaded an old copy of BGP configura-
tion file). The difference though is that this time it only took them one day to fix all 
the problems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please note that, via this example, we again observe the big advantage of integrat-
ing machine and human intelligence. From human’s point of view, the correlation 
between the CSM (skyblue) OASC events and the CMS (yellow) events is very clear. 
After watching the animation and interactively identifying the AS causing the prob-
lem, we will not consider, for example, the big yellow screens on both April 12 and 19 
as errors probably because we know AS-15412 over at UK was trying to fix the prob-
lems they created. But, to draw the same conclusion without the right visual abstrac-
tion or without any human intelligence is very hard to achieve. On those two days 
(April 12 and 19 in 2001), without the right correlation as we shown here, thousands 
of false alarms might have been reported. 
5.3 One Mistake: How about France Telecom? 
When we first studied the instance in April 6-19, 2001, we believed, visually, that AS-
15412 made “exactly” the same mistake on both April 6 and 18 of 2001 because the 
shapes visually look exactly the same. We reached this conclusion based on purely 
visual correlation. Earlier this year (2003), one of our colleagues from France Telecom 
came to us with their own AS numbers (AS-3215 and AS-5511). They would like to 
find out how many OASC events were related to their own ASes. While we quickly 
realized, using our Elisha BGP visualization tool, that France Telecom’s ASes have 
been involved in relatively small number of OASC events, we also found out one mis-
take we made in the previous subsection: France Telecom’s ASes were not involved 
on April 6, but they were indeed part of some OASC events on April 18. This implies 
that, although the graphs on 6th and 18th look the same, they are different in a minor 
ways. It turned out that only a very small portion of ASes behave differently between 
6th and 18th. 
6. Remarks 
In a large complex system, it is impossible to consider all possible attacks or faults. It 
is also very difficult to pre-design and pre-implement a set of mechanisms to detect 
and respond to problems not being seriously considered before. However, while human 
intelligence (such as the security instance response team) can certainly complement an 
intrusion detection system, we need to have an effective interaction process to follow 
in order to resolve problems correctly and quickly. 
With our original 2D representation (i.e., counting BGP/OASC events) as shown in 
Section 4, relatively little information can be derived and we need to dig into the raw 
BGP data to analyze the problem instances. For the instance of August 14, we cannot 
even spot the anomaly from the 2D representation, and it was treated as a “normal” 
noise. But, with our visualization program, we can not only detect the “blue” color 
anomaly but also go deep into the information using different representation methods 
with only a few clicks. As a result, we identify the possible error made by the AS-
7777. Please note that our system was designed and built BEFORE we were aware of 
the AS-7777 instance in August 14, 2000 or other similar instances. 
In handling millions of events from a large complex distributed system such as 
Internet, “false alarms” and “event correlation” become two most critical issues (or 
technical bottlenecks). Our visual representation for the OASC events here provides a 
global and abstract picture about the BGP/OASC activities in the Internet. Therefore, 
the human operator will be given not only a huge set of events but also the context and 
the relations among the events graphically. An experienced human operator can then 
use our system to justify the validity of a reported attack instance based on his/her 
comprehensive awareness of the target system. On the other hand, if he/she is not 
certain about the situation, then the interactive process should guide him/her to navi-
gate more information to reduce the potential false positive. Second, as demonstrated 
in Section 6.2, our system provides the capability of visual event correlation such that 
a human operator can quickly correlate a set of reported events and provide a valid 
explanation about what is going on. 
Again in the 2D counter-type figure in Section 4, we can see big spikes in April 
2001, but to completely understand what was going on is a very difficult task. If not 
correlating events correctly, the system administrator would have to digest more than 
tens of thousands of events over a two-week period. And, hopefully some correct 
abstraction of these events can be discovered. But, again, with our program’s anima-
tion features, the right, short/compact, and abstractive conclusion can be drawn 
quickly for all these events. 
Via the experience in using our programs to analyze the BGP routing data on the 
Internet (we have another visualization program for BGP route path stability, which 
has not been described in this paper), we have demonstrated the great potential in 
applying information visualization techniques to critical problems in fault and intru-
sion detection on network routing protocols such as BGP. We believe that the integra-
tion of human and machine intelligence via the technique of information visualization 
may provide yet another important avenue to enhance the performance, security, and 
fault tolerance of the Internet. 
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